(Photo by Chris Montgomery via IranWire/CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED)
On May 18, 2025, Romanians headed to the polls for their second presidential election in half a year. The original election, which took place in late 2024, was held to replace incumbent president Klaus Iohannis at the end of his second five-year term. However, Romania’s Constitutional Court cancelled the winter election ahead of its second round. The Court believed that Russian disinformation campaigns had affected the fairness and legality of the election, forcing a re-vote.
This move came after far-right candidate Călin Georgescu shockingly came in first in the initial round of December votes. Georgescu had been trailing behind more mainstream candidates in Romanian pre-election polls, and far exceeded expectations with his first-place finish.
Georgescu is known for his pro-Russian, pro-Trump, and anti-European Union (EU) views. He has praised both Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, and promised to “Make Romania Great Again,” mirroring Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan. Georgescu also vowed to cut all aid to Ukraine.
Georgescu is also known for spreading disinformation. For example, a few weeks before the December election, Georgescu posted false information about Ukrainian refugees living in Romania due to the ongoing Russian invasion. The debunked video featured Georgescu talking about how Ukrainian refugee children receive welfare payments many times greater than those received by Romanians. Georgescu used this to justify reducing aid to Ukraine.
As no candidate received a majority of votes on November 24, 2024, a second round was scheduled for December 8. However, Romania’s Constitutional Court cancelled the election a few days before the runoff, throwing out the results from the first round. Further, the Court barred Georgescu from running again in the redone election.
How Social Media Propelled Georgescu’s Campaign
Georgescu amplified his policy ideas through posting on TikTok, the short-form video app. TikTok is very popular in Romania, with around 9 million active adult users in 2024 in a country of 19 million people. In particular, Georgescu posted videos of himself doing daily activities to cultivate his image as a down-to-earth Christian man. He also shared clips of his interviews with traditional media on TikTok to highlight key policy ideas and platform themes.
Despite Georgescu’s seemingly-innocuous social media behaviour in the run-up to an election, Romanian and French intelligence identified tens of thousands of fake social media accounts that became active shortly before the original election in late 2024. These accounts repeatedly posted content calling for “a family man, who’s honest and patriotic” as president, matching Georgescu’s carefully-cultivated image. These messages simulated support for Georgescu, successfully boosting his visibility and popularity on TikTok’s algorithms.
Furthermore, Georgescu’s campaign received financial support from unknown sources, which he did not declare to the electoral authorities. Accounts supporting Georgescu reportedly possessed over €1 million ($1.57 million CAD) in unacknowledged funding.
But, Russian disinformation did not begin with Georgescu’s presidential campaign. For years, experts have suspected Russia has an alternative media system spreading disinformation, aiming to stoke anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiment in Romania. Some examples include claims that the EU is stealing Romania’s resources and conspiracies about COVID-19. Georgescu parroted these falsehoods in his campaign and, in turn, they were shared on social media by the many thousands of fake accounts.
The Far-Right Stays Popular in Romania
In the rerun elections in May, another far-right candidate, George Simion, shot up in the polls and nearly won the election. Simion won over 40% of the vote in the first round, while the candidates in second and third place received just over 20% each. Though a centrist, pro-EU candidate named Nicușor Dan ultimately won in the second round, Simion still received over 46% of the second-round votes. With such a strong showing, it is clear that the far-right remains popular among Romanians.
Simion, like Georgescu, used social media strategically to spread his platform. He posted dozens of videos per day highlighting his patriotism and anti-EU stance, promising to prioritize what he claimed were Romania’s interests over those of the EU. Furthermore, social media disinformation campaigns were again utilized by Simion in the election, much like in Georgescu’s campaign in the winter.
Russian Disinformation Campaigns Promote Pro-Russian Policy
During the campaign, Simion promised to drastically reduce aid to Ukraine and improve relations with Russia in direct opposition to EU policy. Fellow EU member states such as Slovakia and Hungary already oppose the EU’s stance on Ukraine. As Romania has previously been a strong supporter of Ukraine, an abrupt change caused by the election of Georgescu or Simion would have dealt a significant blow to the EU’s unity on this issue.
Disinformation promotes denialism of Ukraine’s independence and agency as a country. Rhetoric from Georgescu may further inflame these sentiments, as he continues to deny Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Earlier this year, Georgescu made public comments in favour of Romania, Poland, and Hungary annexing parts of Ukraine. Disinformation campaigns often aim to decrease the public’s trust in factual information, increasing the chance that the public will believe politically-motivated disinformation.
After Romania’s Constitutional Court disqualified Georgescu from running in the rerun election, hundreds of demonstrators took to the streets of Bucharest, Romania’s capital. These protestors called the annulment of the original election a “coup d’etat,” and demanded the reversal of this decision.
Georgescu himself went one step further, describing the move as an attack on democracy itself. Individual supporters of Georgescu also believed the election cancellation was a move by the political establishment to keep power. When democratic institutions take action against disinformation campaigns, they can inadvertently fuel the rhetoric surrounding election fraud or manipulation. This rhetoric can ultimately lessen trust in democracy.
Romania Is Not An Isolated Example
Romania is not the only country hit by Russian disinformation campaigns. Other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members, such as the United States (US), Germany, and Slovakia, were targeted in their recent presidential election and parliamentary elections, respectively. These campaigns all had one thing in common – they promote governments abroad that are more favourable to Russia and its policy goals.
Pro-Russian parties have suspected influence in international policy decisions, notably within Trump’s 2025 victory in the US presidential election. Since Trump took office in the US, his administration has promoted Russian narratives about its war in Ukraine, including blaming Ukraine for starting the war. He has also expressed support for Russia’s policy goals, such as keeping Ukraine out of NATO and denying the return of Russian-occupied territories to Ukraine.
This policy shift, which was made without consulting any of America’s NATO allies, emboldens Russia in its imperialistic foreign policy. Decreasing aid to Ukraine, as these pro-Russian forces promise to do, would have devastating consequences for Ukraine’s resistance against Russia as well.
Why Disinformation Campaigns Work
Despite the fact that they are based on lies, disinformation campaigns work because they exploit real grievances among the population. In Romania’s presidential election, Georgescu was largely seen as the anti-establishment candidate and thus received many votes from those who were dissatisfied with more historically successful parties. Both Georgescu and Simion received significant support from Romania’s diaspora communities abroad, many of whom moved abroad due to economic difficulties in Romania. Many in this community thus align with the messaging about putting Romania first. Governments need to work on the dissatisfaction that the population may have with the government and the existing system.
In addition, disinformation campaigns also simplify complex problems, such as economic pressures, by providing a simple scapegoat. For example, disinformation campaigns in Romania often promote conspiracies about NATO “stealing Romanian resources” and turning Romania into a vassal state. This plays into anxieties about Romania’s economy, as millions of Romanians have moved out of the country since the early 2000s, largely in search of better economic opportunities.
Blaming NATO and other Western countries for subjugating Romania allows Georgescu to offer easy solutions for the country’s problems. These alternate explanations can also give voters hope, especially those who are frustrated with the lack of progress under politicians who are currently in power.
What Can Be Done?
With disinformation campaigns targeting many countries, it is important to be able to recognize them. For example, there are many guides online from governmental or other trusted sources on how to identify disinformation. Social media companies also have a responsibility to enforce their own regulations. By closing loopholes, social media sites can prevent their platform from being used to spread election disinformation.
Therefore, if democratic parties want to combat the rise of election disinformation, they must continue to work on addressing issues such as the high cost of living and unemployment. Pro-Russian parties do not succeed solely because of disinformation campaigns – they win votes because they provide easy answers for difficult societal questions. Russia’s interference only propels its message using any means possible, including spreading lies, for its own policy goals.
Edited by Ashley Renz
